Michigan Law Review
Volume 42

Issue 2

1943

SALES - PLACE OF TITLE - "CASH SALES"
J. B. W.
University of Michigan Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Commercial Law Commons

Recommended Citation
J. B. W., SALES - PLACE OF TITLE - "CASH SALES", 42 MICH. L. REV. 328 (1943).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol42/iss2/11

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 42

SALES - PLACE OF TITLE - "CASH SALES" - The plaintiffs contracted
to sell lambs not yet in existence to Boylen; $500 was paid at the execution of the
contract in May, an additional $500 was to be paid in August, and the remaining
amount was "to be paid on delivery of the lambs." The August payment was
made. On September 20 plaintiffs delivered the lambs to J:3oylen at a railway
.shipping station. There was no station agent at the place, no bill of lading was
taken out and no bill of sale or other paper transferred. Apparently the lambs
were simply delivered into the possession of Boylen and left there. At that time
Boylen gave plaintiffs a draft for the full amount still due. Plaintiffs sent this
draft through the banks with reasonable expedition, but it was dishonored because of Boylen's insolvency. In tne meantime Boylen, soon after receiving the
lambs, sold 955 of them to the defendant to whom he delivered them by .rail;
the defendant paid for them full value and in good faith. When plaintiffs traced
these lambs, they sued defendant in what the court interpreted as an action for
conversion with waiver of the tort and an implied promise by defendant to pay
plaintiffs the value. Held, the plaintiffs were entitled to judgment for the value
of the lambs. Keegan v. Lenzie, (Ore. 1943) 135 P. (2d) 717.
It is trite learning that a purchaser in good faith from one who himself has
title acquires title against a previous owner, even though the latter might have
recovered, because of fraud in the inducement, from his immediate purchaser.
If Boylen acquired title to the lambs when they were delivered to his possession
and left there, this rule would protect the defendant despite Boyle~'s fraud on his
vendor. On the other hand, as the court points out, it is equally trite learning
that if Boylen had not title when he sold. to the defendant, the latter could not
hope to prevail against the plaintiff in the absence of estoppel; and the court
found that Boylen had obtained no indicia of ownership from the plaintiff except
the possession, which is not normally enough on which to predicate an estoppel.
Thus defendant's rights depended upon whether or notJ3oylen had obtained title
as well as possession from plaintiff. The court labeled the transaction a "cash
sale." When it had once attached this label, the rest was easy; in a "cash sale"
the title is not intended to pass until delivery; therefore it did not pass; Boylen
had no title to pass on to defendant. But was that label properly attached? Was
the transaction in truth a "cash sale," with title retained until payment of the
draft-a three or four day period at least? Or was it merely a sale, with the
agreement that the price would be paid-in form of a draft or otherwise-at the
time possession was delivered? Theoretically, courts look for the intent of the
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parties to determine the propriety of the label given. Practically, because the intent cannot be really determined from the facts, they choose the consequence
they deem desirable and assume an intent that will produce that consequence.1
So far as precedents for the particular fact situation are concerned, the decisions
are in hopeless confusion.2 The situation in the principal case was in truth one of
those numerous ones which ought to be more frankly admitted, where a court
is free to settle the rights of the parties as it chooses to do, and does so settle them
as a matter of choice, however persuasive the authority it cites in justification.

J.B.W.

1 See Levin, "The Intention Fallacy in the Construction of Title Retaining Contracts," 24 M1cH. L. REv. 130 (1925); 36 D1cKINSON L. REv. 277 (1932); Vold,
"Cash Sales," 14 ST. Loms L. REV. l (1928).
2 Accord with principal case, e.g.: Blackwood v. Cutting Packing Co., 76 Cal. 212,
18 P. 248 (1888); Dalrymple v. Randall, Gee & M. Co., 144 Minn. 27, 174 N. W.
520 (1919). Contra, e.g., J. I. Case Threshing Mach. Co. v. Bargabos, 143 Minn. 8,
172 N. W. 882 (1919); Turner v. Moore, 58 Vt. 455, 3 A. 467 (1886).

